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SOCIAL CONTRACT I: HARSANYI AND RAWLS
by Ken Binmore*
And don't kid yourselves that there's any law in Poisonville except
.what you make for yourself.
Dashiell Hammett, Red Harvest.
1. Introduction. This is the first of several papers whose beginnings lie in
Rawls' [1958,1968,1972] theory of the social contract. The aim of the sequence of
papers is to defend a version of Rawls' "egalitarian"1 conclusion for a world in which
agents are assumed to be constrained only by rational self-interest. No foundational
issues are taken for granted. This is partly because I hope to make the work accessible
to a wider audience; but mostly because I believe that much confusion in the literature
derives from straightforward misunderstandings on matters which ought not to be
controversial.
It should be emphasized that the program entails a very substantial reevaluation
of Rawls' approach. The current paper follows numerous others in arguing that he
is on shaky ground in rejecting orthodox decision theory. But, if orthodox decision
theory is retained, then his line of reasoning leads inexorably to a species of
utilitarianism, as demonstrated by Harsanyi [1953,1955,1958,1977]. Since much of
the apparatus is required for later purposes, the paper describes an elaborated version
* The material of this paper is extracted from a long ST/ICERD discussion paper,
"Caine Theory and the Social Contract" (88/170). This supersedes an earlier ST/ICERD
discussion paper (84/108) with the same title. I am grateful to Reinhart Selten and to
John Harsanyi for their comments. It should be noted that Harsanyi is not comfortable
with the contractarian reinterpretation of his model proposed here.
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tle iodel that Harsanvi uses in this defense of utilitarianism. For simplicity, only
two agents are ever considered.
The paper continues with a criticism of the assumptions underlying this defense.
Three difficulties are distinguished:
(1) The first difficulty concerns the use of the Harsanyi doctrine: namely that
rati onal agents in identical circumstances necessarily have identical characteristics.
(2) The second difficulty is to be found in the argument's reliance on exogenously
determined and unexplained interpersonal wtility comparisons.
(3) The third difficulty lies in the fact that agents are assumed to be able to
rnake binding comrnitrnents about their future conduct.
The third difficulty seems to me an insurmountable obstacle for both Rawls
anid Harsanyi. Ilawls [1972. 1)167] faces the difficulty squarely in his "slave-holder's
argument" which is examined in Section 7. It is essential for my purposes that
Rawls' conclusions on this subject be rejected but, in doing so, it seems to me that
one is only taking the views he expresses elsewhere on the "strains of commitment"
[1972, p176] to their logical conclusion. Harsanyi's [1977] position on commitment is
formally watertight 2 , but it seems to me to face the same difficulties as Rawls' in so
far as practical appplication is concerned.
The remainder of the paper is concerned with the manner in which it is proposed
to deal with the first and second difficulty in later papers. The procedure is valid
whether or not Harsanvi's commitment assumption is thought appropriate. For the
purposes of illustrating the technique, it is therefore convenient to grant Harsanyi his
commitment assumptions in the last part of the paper. The resulting analysis can
111 h 1 be? seen as an1 attempt t~o strengthen Harsanyi's defense of utilitarianism by easing
(difhculties one and two. But the author's skepticism about dlifficulty three should
always be born, in rnind. Of the three sections devoted to this analysis, section S
surveys the simp)lifying properties of the model bought by taking commliitnmnt
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for granted. Sections 9 and 10 contain the substantive contribution. A method for
con uct r'nsting the -extended sympathy preferences" required in Harsanyi's methodology
is described and an evolutionary justification for this construction is proposed. This
)rovidIes an "idealized explanation" for both the origin of inter-personal comparisons
of utility and the use of the Harsanyi doctrine in this context. The argument requires
the contemplation of asymmetries in Rawls' "original position". In anticipation of
this need, section 4 offers an elaboration of Harsanyi's model within which such
asymmetries are expressible.
Five further papers in the current sequence are planned. Part II will be an
attempt to clear up some misunderstandings about game theory and its applications
to bargaining. Parts III and IV will be asides on evolutionary issues relevant to what
comes later. Part V will contain a Humean reinterpretation of Rawls' social contract
theory (as opposed to his IKantian view). Within this reinterpretation, "egalitarian"
conclusions can be defended without recourse to hypotheses that need distress any
conservative, no matter how red his neck. (This will seem less surprising when one
learns how what it is that gets split equally is defined.) The ideas are closely related
to those of Buchanan [1975,1976] and Sugden [1986]. Part VI will relate this work to
the literature on cooperative bargaining theory. Finally, there will be a paper with
the title "A Liberal Leviathan" which offers a philosophical overview.
2. The original position. Harsanyi [1977] is not a contractarian. Nevertheless, this
section contains a reconstruction of his defense of utilitarianism within a contractual
setting. It seems to me that his argument is then at its most powerful. The
immediate discussion will be a naive one. In particular, the difficulties mentioned in
thie introduction are suppressed until later. Other more fundamental difficulties are
not considered at all in the current paper. Why. for example, do some people find
the device of the original position morally satisfying? What is the soui'ce of such
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moral intuitions? And why should they be thought relevant to the conduct of rational
men of affairs? The program of which this paper is a part requires that answers be
proposed to such questions, but it would be premature to offer them here.
To quote Rawis [1972, p17]: ". . . the original position is the initial status
quo3 which insures that the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair". The
original position is called upon to give expression to what Rawls terms "the principle
of redress". To quote again from Rawls [1972, p100]: "This is the principle that
undeserved inequalities call for redress; and since inequalities of birth and natural
endowment are undeserved these inequalities are to be somehow compensated for."
As a very simple example, which nevertheless gives the flavor of the general
situation, consider the problem faced by Adarn and Eve in the Garden of Eden.
Fig. 1A illustrates a set4 X whose members consist of utility pairs corresponding to
feasible social contracts-i.e. various ways of life they can jointly adopt. The point d
represents a state-of-nature point-i.e. it represents the consequences of a final and
complete failure to come to joint arrangements. Asymmetries in the configuration
correspond to Rawls' "inequalities of birth and natural endowment". The problem
for Adam and Eve is to agree on a point a in X on which to coordinate.
Figures 1A and 1B here
If they were to bargain without further constraints, then there is no particular
reason why the point x on which they finally settle should compensate the party
disadvantaged by the shape of the set X and the location of the point d. Even if one
postulates that the choice of a" is to be delegated to an "ideal observer", who will
arbitrate in a fair" manner, one is still left to provide a definition of what "fair"
should mean. Harsanyi dleals with this difficulty by symnmetrizing the situation. The
synnetrinzation1 is achlieved by requiring that negotiation is carried oiu behind~ at "~v(il of
ignorance". Beyond the veil of ignorance, the roles tha~t the players occupy 111 society
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become unknown. The players therefore have to negotiate a deal without knowing
who is Adam and who is Eve. This ought to benefit the naturally disadvantaged
party. The question is: by how much?
Fig. 1B is a representation of the problem faced by two persons, labeled 1 and 2.
in such an "original position". For definiteness, it will always be assumed that player
1 is actually Adam and player 2 is actually Eve, but that this information is withheld
behind the veil of ignorance. Their ignorance of their actual roles is reflected in the
fact that both player 1 and player 2, in Harsanyi's formulation, attach probability
1/2 to each of the possible role assignments. AE and EA. With role-assignment
AE, player 1 is Adam and player 2 is Eve: the feasible set XAE is therefore X and
the state-of-nature point dAE is d. With role-assignment EA, player 1 is Eve and
player 2 is Adam: the feasible set XEA and the state-of-nature point dEA are then
the reflections of X and d in the line x 1 = z2-
Players 1 and 2 in the original position will be assumed to be able to make
agreements which are contingent on who turns out to be who5 . They may agree, for
example, to implement the utility pair y in set XAE of fig. 1B if player 1 turns out
to be Adam and player 2 turns out to be Eve, but to implement the utility pair z in
set XEA if the roles turn out to be reversed. Since they attach equal probabilities to
the two eventualities, they will assign the utility pair t of fig. 1B to this "contract".
The utility pair t lies at the midpoint of the line segment yz. The set' T of all such
points t, with y in XAE and z in XEA, is shaded in fig. 1B. It is the set of all utility
pairs from which it is feasible for players 1 and 2 to make a joint choice.
Since T is convex and everything is symmetric, it does not matter greatly
wvhat theory of bargaining or arbitration is now employed. Any sensible theory will
select, as the bargaining outcome, the point n in fig. lB that is the unique, Pareto
efficient, symmetric point in T. To obtain this outcome, the players have to agree on
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in)lemeInting the utility pair u in XAE if player 1 turns out to be Adam and player
2 to be Eve, and to implement v in XA if the roles are reversed.
An interpretive comment may be helpful. The actual situation is as in fig. 1A
and it is the "fairness" of v in this situation which is the substantive issue. The
bargaining in the original position is only kypoiketical. In defending the point u,
Adarn tells Eve that, if they had been placed in the original position under the
specified conditions, then they surely would have agreed to make commitments to
abide by the "contract" agreed to, whoever turned out to occupy whichever role.
Eve may not like the consequent outcome, especially if it assigns her less thani her
state-of-nature utility, but she has an obligation to honor the commitment she would
have made in the original position. In summary, if Eve is agreed that it is appropriate
to use the device of the original position and that Adam is right in analyzing what
her behavior in the original position would be, then Eve ought to act as though she
were committed to maintaining the outcome u.
My own view is that this argument begs the questions which really matter.
However, cominent on this issue is postponed until section 7. Until then, the
discussion will proceed without challenging the commitment assumptions built into
Adam's defense of the point v.
In what sense can Harsanyi's proposed resolution of the problem be said to
be utilitarian? The answer is simple, although it is not perhaps an answer that a
dyed-in-the-wool utilitarian would find entirely satisfying. The point u in fig. 1A is
utilitarian in that it is the point in X at which the arithmetic sum
UA +_UE
of Adlam and Eve's utilities is mnaximized.
It is imnediately apparent that some sleight-of-hand has been visited upuon
the unwary. The stun of the utilities can only be meaningful if the utilities are
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comparable. Harsanyi does not neglect this issue. But, before discussing his approach
to the inter-personal comparison of utilities, it is necessary to give some attention to
Rawls' wholesale rejection. in the current conte:.:t. of utility theory itself.
3. Maximin criterion. If a naive view is taken and problems of utility comparison
are ignored, then the Rawlsian "difference principle" selects the point r in fig. 1A-i.e.
the equal-split point. However, Rawls does not take a naive view on utility questions.
Indeed, so sophisticated is his view that he will have no truck with utility theory at
all. Instead, he works in terms of what he calls "primary goods". But it does not
seem to me that he can be allowed to dispense with utility theory and then proceed
as though all the problems for which utility theory was created do not exist.
For example, if the axes in fig. 1B are re-interpreted in terms of primary goods
(however defined), then orthodox decision theory would require the players to be
heavily risk-averse if the point r is not to be Pareto-inferior to a lottery attaching
equal probabilities to u and v as advocated by Harsanyi. Rawls therefore needs to
deny the validity of orthodox Bayesian decision theory in this context. Consequently,
he insists that those in the original position use only objective probabilities (i.e.
probabilities obtained by the observation of long-run frequencies) and eschew the
use of subjective probabilities altogether. The aim is to rule out Harsanyi's lottery
on the grounds, that since no actual coin is tossed, any evaluations made in the
original position about prospective role-assignments will necessarily be subjective in
character. He buttresses this position by recalling the well-known difficulties with
Laplace's "principle of insufficient reason" and goes on to advocate the maxiinn
criterion (rather than the maximization of expected Von Neumann and Morgenstern
utility) with a reference to Milnor's axiornatization of "complete ignorance" (Luce
and Raiffa [1957, p297]. Since the "difference principle" is, in essence, the maximin
criterion, little further analysis is then required.'
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It is not denied that Rawls' views on this subject have considerable force when
applied to the arcane practices of naive Bayesians in general. Indeed, I have written
at length elsewhere [Binmore,1987,section 6] about the difficulties in the foundations
of game theory that arise from a naive use of Bayesian principles. I am therefore not,
entirely in sympathy with the position from which Harsanyi [1975] attacks Rawls' use
of the maxinin criterion. (See also Rawls' [1974] reply.) But these problems in the
foundations of game theory arise from a thoughtless application of a decision theory
designed for use with "closed universe" problems to "open universe problems". In
brief, for a "closed universe" problem, it is necessary that there be no unresolved
doubts about the nature of the fundamental domain of uncertainty. In Milnor's
axiomatization of "complete ignorance" such doubts are embodied in his "column
duplication" axiom. His theory, as its title suggests, is therefore very much an "open
universe" one.
But should we follow Rawls in classifying the informational situation in the
original position as "open"? I think not. After all, the fundamental domain of
uncertainty is just a. two-element set {AE, EA} whose members represent the two
possible role assignments. No doubts can exist about what this set is, because it is
given a priori as part of the definition of the original position.
One cannot then simply deny that individuals will make decisions as though
maximizing the expected value of a utility function relative to subjective probabilities
for the two role assignments AE 'and EA. Such a denial requires rejecting one or more
of Savage's [1951] axioms for Bayesian decision theory. But if they are to be rejected
in this simplest of all possible cases, then they have to be rejected always. Perhaps
they ought to be. But, if so, their rejection should be based on their failings as
rationality principles rather than because a rather distant and doubtful consequence
is found displeasing.
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The Savage theory only implies that rational individuals will make decisions as
though AE and EA occur with certain probabilities. It does not require that these
subjctive )probabilities be equal. However, in requiring that those inl the original
position do attach equal subjective probabilities to the role assignments, one is not
claimring universal validity for the Laplace principle. Indeed, the whole idea that the
informational, circumstances of those beyond the veil of ignorance has somehow to
be deduced from primitive ur-assumptions strikes me as misguided. In particular,
it should be a matter of definition that the subjective probabilities assigned to the
role assignments be equal. Everything is then up-front. Fairness is being defined as
"symmetry in the original position": nothing more and nothing less.
These remarks are perhaps over-emphatic. But I agree very much with Rawls
[1972, p121] that:
We should strive for a kind of moral geometry with all the rigor
that this name connotes.
4. Extended sympathy. How would one implement Harsanyi's conclusions in the
real world? First it would be necessary, by observation or experiment, to discover
Adam's and Eve's personal preferences. If Adam and Eve are rational in their
attitudes to risk in the sense axiomatized by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, these
preferences can be represented by utility functions (PA : S -+ R and E : S -+ R in
such a way that Adam and Eve always behave as though maximizing expected utility.
For example, if
(pA(T) = (pA(p)+ %PA())/ 2 ,
then Adam will necessarily be indifferent between getting the state T for certain, and
the lottery which assigns probability 1/2 to each of the states p and a.
The rationality principles do not determine a Von Neumann and Morgenstern
utility function p: S -+ R uniquely on the set S of states over which the preferences
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extend. A second function 0: S - R describes the same preferences if and only if
constants B > 0 and C exist for which # = BWp+ C. This serves to emphasize the fact
that the rationality principles, in themselves, provide no basis at all for comparing
the utility scales of different individuals.
One may fix a. unique Von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function for an
individual by insisting that it take the values 0 and 1 at two appropriate benchmark
states. It is convenient to take a state h (hell) which is regarded as worse than any
immediately relevant state by both Adam and Eve, and a state H (heaven) which is
regarded by both as better than any relevant state. Thus, in what follows:
Wa(h) = 'E(h) = 0
4A(H) = E(H) = 1.
The set of feasible states will be denoted by So. The states s in So are those
which can result from the implementation of a social contract. The set X in fig. 1A
is defined by
(4.1) X = {(p A(s), RE(3)) : £ 6 So}.
The state-of-nature is denoted by so. Also, a = pA(so) and 1 - b = WE(so). Thus
d = (a, 1 - b) in fig. 1A.
Sometimes, an arbitrary calibration of utility scales, as introduced above, is
treated as though it established a sensible basis for the inter-personal comparison of
utilities, but nothing of the kind is proposed here. The line taken on this issue will be
an orthodox one: namely that use must be made of the theory of extended sympathy
aintroduced by Arrow [1978] and Suppes [1966].
In order for fig. 1B to be meaningful for players 1 and 2, it is necessary for
themr to b~e able to compare in their own minds, howv it would be. for exampJle, to be
Adam dIrinking a cup of tea. as opposed to Eve drinking a cup) of c'offee. To be more
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l)recise, they nee(l to have prefereiices over the set {A, E} x S. These preferences will
be called extended sympathy preferences. As with personal preferences. if rationality
is assumed, Von Neumann and Morgenstern utility functions b {A, E} x S -+ R
and #2:{A, E} x S -+ R will exist. For example, 41 (E, s) is the utility assigned
by player 1 to being Eve in state s.
If player 1 takes seriously what it would mean to be Eve, then he must surely
admit that, if he were Eve, then his preferences over states would be the same as
Eve's personal preferences. This will be taken as a basic assumption. The utility
functions 41(E,-) and WE then represent the same preferences over S, and hence, for
each s E 5,
'1(E, s) = B1EpE(s) +.C1E,
where B1 E > 0 and C1 E are constants. Similar equations will also hold with E
replaced by A and with 1 replaced by 2.
The extended sympathy utility functions will be normalized so that
(4.2) <bi(A,h) = 0 ; <>;(E,H) = 1 (i = 1,2).
The eight constants BiA, CiA, BiE, CiE (i = 1.2) can then be expressed in terms of
the quantities
U; = 4(A,H)>0;1-V= t=(E, h) < 1 (i=1,2).
(To insist that Ui K 1 and V 1(i = 1,2) means that it is commonly agreed that
Adam would suffer more in hell then Eve, and Eve would enjoy greater bliss in heaven
than Adam.) A trivial calculation shows that. for each s E 5,
(4.3) t(A, s) = UicPA(s)
<b;(E, s) = 1 - V'i(1 - p 6(s))
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The sets XAE and XEA of fig. 1B are defined as
XTA E= {(f1(A, s), 1 2 (E, s)) : sE So}
XEA = {(( 1(E, s), :2 (A, s)) : E So}.
Similarly, dAE = (41 (A, so), 42 (E, so)) and dEA = (I1(E,so),' 2 (A,so)). These
definitions expose one of the difficulties in the exposition of Harsanyi's argument as
given in section 2. The difficulty arises from the fact that nothing in the argument
offered so far justifies the symmetry of fig. 1B.
Write a = U2/U1 and 0 = V1 /V2 . If PAE = (u, 1 - v) is the utility pair arising
from a state s when player 1 is Adam and player 2 is Eve, then PEA = (1 - /37, au)
is the utility pair resulting from the same state s when the roles are reversed. Thus,
for example,
-YEA = {(1 -/(1 -ax 2 ),o'x 1 ) : (2 1,x 2 ) E XAE}.
Fig. 2A illustrates the situation. In this figure, A = sup{pA(s) : s E So} and
1-p = sup{- E(s):s E So}.
Note in particular that symmetry arises if and only if U1 = U2 and V1 = V2
-i.e., <b1 = <b2. Without symmetry, it is no longer entirely trivial to resolve the
bargaining problem in the original position. Section 8(iii) contains some justifying
remarks for using the Nash bargaining solution for this purpose. The Nash bargaining
solution for a set T of feasible "deals", when the result of disagreement will be the
point we, is the point n at which the "Nash product" (n1 - tri)(n2 - W2) is maximized
subject to the constraints that n E T and n > w. If matters were as in fig. 2B, there
would be nothing obviously utilitarian about the point u that Adam would then have
to defend to Eve a~s "fair''.
Figures 2A and 2B here
It will be necessary to return to this asymmetric set-up) in section 10. A more
careful analysis will then be offered.
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5. The Harsanyi doctrine. Equations (4.3) provide intra-personal comparisons
of utilities. Player 1 regards one Adam-util as equivalent to U1 /V1 Eve-utils. Player
2 regards one Adam-util as equivalent to U2/V 2 Eve-utils. Harsanyi converts these
intra-personal comparisons into a single inter-personal comparison using a form of
what game theorists, following Aumann [1987], call the "Harsanyi doctrine". To
caricature the doctrine. it is that human beings share a common psychological
iiiheiitance and hence, if they shared a precisely identical history of experience, then
they would arrive at precisely the same judgements.
In the circumstances of the original position, Harsanyi argues that players 1
and 2 have effectively the same history of experience and hence will form the same
extended sympathy judgements. This means that '2 = B4 1 +C for suitable constants
B > 0 and C. In view of the normalization (4.2), it follows that U1 = U2, Vi =12
and hence 4i = 'I2. Thus symmetry is secured. Notice that, when player 1's and
player 2's intra-personal comparisons coincide, their common view constitutes an
inter-personal comparison of Adam's and Eves personal utility scales.
I am uncomfortable with this piece of legerdemain. I agree with Hume
[1793, p576] that we actually do have extended sympathy preferences. The reason is
that we need to be able to imagine ourselves in the shoes of our fellows in order to
he able to operate successfully as social (but autonomous) animals. Since player 1 is
actually Adam and Adam has extended sympathy preferences, why then are player
1's extended sympathy preferences not simply those of Adam? Of course, if Adam
and Eve have different extended sympathy preferences, then the veil of ignorance
would need to be extended so that they forget whose extended sympathy preferences
are whose. Otherwise they would be able to deduce their real-world identities from
their information. However, I believe that it can be successfully argued that, in an
ideal world, evolution would supply Adam and Eve with the same extended sympathy
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preferences. One would then have what one might call a Humean defense of the
Harsa.nyi doctrine in this context.
If, on the other hand, one insists on maintaining a Kantian perspective within
which evolutionary arguments have no place, then the prognosis seems to me to be
gloomy. The fiction of hypothetical bargaining in the original position is powerful
and arresting. but each new fiction which is introduced to facilitate its analysis
attenuates its appeal. Obviously, one wants to minimize on what is assumed about
those in the original position. Once this principle is abandoned, who is to say whose
fiction is to be preferred? Rawls' fiction, that bargainers in the original positon will
treat {AE, EA} as an "open universe", was examined in section 3. Harsanyi offers
the fiction that Adam and Eve are able to predict what their extended sympathy
preferences would be if they were called upon to construct these de novo beyond the
veil of ignorance-i.e. without reference to their own current extended sympathy
preferences or the experiences which led to these preferences being held. Given
this hypothesis, doubtless Adam and Eve would indeed make the same prediction.
Equally, if the Riemann conjecture were decided, all mathematicians would agree on
its truth value.
6. Inter-personal comparison. Harsanyi [1977, p55] asserts that there is "an
unavoidable need for inter-personal comparison of utility in ethics". (See also, for
example, Hammond [1976].) To see why he says this, observe that four constants,
U1, U2, V1 and V2 characterize the normalized extended sympathy utility functions of
section 4. The Harsanyi doctrine reduces these to two: namely, U1 = U2 = U aid
= V2 = '. Fig. 3A makes it obvious that the values of U and V matter. Two
situations are considered. The difference is only that, in the second, V is replaced by
1V*. But it will be clear that the state corresponding to the utilitarian point u is very
different to that corresponding to 11*.
Figures 3A and 3B :ere
A further difficulty with the expositior. of Harsanyi's argument as given in
section 2 has therefore been isolated. The identi:cation of XAE with X in section 2
is not innocent. Without this identification,.only a form of weighted utilitarianism is
obtained. That is to say, the point u selected fron X is not that illustrated in fig. 1A.
Instead, it is the point at which
UUA +V UE
is maximized. Harsanyi deals with this issue by replacing the personal utility functions
WA and VE by renormalized alternatives VA = C JA and ?E = V E. This provides a
fiat identification of X and XAE. But the problem, of course, does not go away. For
one cannot tell at what state OA(s) + 0EtE(s) is n. aximized without knowing the value
of U/V. Thus Harsanyi's insistence on the necessity for inter-personal comparison in
ethics.
I do not doubt that this necessity exists. My complaint is that I do not see
how such comparisons are to be "distilled from the air". To proceed as though such
comparisons can be assumed to be exogenovu.ly determined, is to beg many of the
questions which matter.
7. Commitment and slave-holding. Section 9 contains some evolutionary
considerations which I believe can be used to defend Harsanyi's analysis from the
difficulties raised in sections 5 and 6. But the next difficulty seems to me insuperable
for a utilitarian conclusion.
A commitment is a binding promise. Since Schelling [1960], it has been under-
stood how difficult it is, in real life, to rnake gerzine commitments. Ellsberg's [1975]
kidnapping paradigm is often quoted in this context. The victim would dearly
love to make a commitment not to reveal the kidnapper's identity if released. The
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kidnapper, not wishing to murder his victim and having already received the ransom,
would dearly love to be able to believe that a commitment had been made. But
no mechanism exists for making an attempted commitment stick in such situations.
In consequence of such examples, most game theorists nowadays treat commitment
very gingerly. Each commitment opportunity, in so far as these exist, is modeled as
a formal move within the game itself. The formal game is then analyzed without
further comrnitincit assumptions of any kind being incorporated into the analysis.
Harsanyi has been a leading advocate of this approach in other contexts, but does not
believe it appropiate to take the same line in his ethical writings. Nor does Rawls, as
the following story indicates.
Rawls [1972, p167] considers a. slave who complains about her condition of
servitude. The slave-holder justifies his position to the slave with the followng version
of a social contract argument. "If you had been asked to agree to a structure for
society without knowing what your role in that society was to be. then you would
have agreed to a slave-holding society because the prospective benefits of being a
slave-holder would have outweighed in your mind the prospective costs of being a
slave. Finding yourself a slave, you therefore have no just case for complaint." Rawls,
of course, denies that a slave-holding society would be agreed to in the original
position. But he takes pains to argue that the slave-holder's argument would be
correct if it were true that a. slave-holding society would have been agreed to in the
original position, and explicitly rejects the slave's objection that she sees no grounds
for honoring a hypothetical contract to which she never actually assented and which
postulates a lottery for the random distribution of advantage which never actually
took place. The slave-holder rnay continue by saving, "I agree that you never actually
signed a contract. But this is not the issue. We can compute the terms of the contract
that you surely would have wished to have signed if the circumstances of the original
p)ositionl had arisen. Either you raust admit that you have a commitment to honor this
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contract or you have to deny that the device of :he original position is appropriate in
(etermining what is or is not fair.2 As for the lr:tery, it is not hypothetical. Nature
runs the lottery when she chooses who will be b1rn into what station in life."
The weakness of this argument lies in its q-:asi-legal use of the word "contract".
It takes for granted that, because one would have wished to have made a commitment
and perhaps therefore have uttered appropiate words or signed a piece of paper,
therefore a commitment would have been made. But, without a mechanism for
making commitments stick. such gestures would be empty. For a person to have
claimed, whether hypothetically or actually, that he or she is committed to a course
of action is not the same as that person being cornmitted to the course of action. As
Hume [1739, p306] observes
. . . we are not surely bound to keep our word because we have
given our word to keep it.
The slave should point out that, although she and the slave-holder might have wished
to be able to make commitments in the original position, no magic wand could have
been at hand to make such wishes come true.
Essentially the same criticism may be applied to Harsanyi, although he differs
from Rawls in seeing himself only as describing certain "ethical preferences". It is
therefore enough for his formal conclusions that people should wish that society were
such that certain hypothetical obligations were binding. The criticism therefore has
to be directed, not at his theory as such, but a- the possibility of its finding any
useful application.
My own view has already been expressed in section 5. It is that it is necessary
to minimize the number of fictions to be promrdgated about the original position.
The slave-holder may respond to the slave's objection that a magic wand is necessary
to make wishes come true by hypothesizing the existence of a magic wand, but the
slave is not likely to be convinced. Of course. proponents of the opposing view are
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more subtle about the deits ex machina brought onto the scene. They assert that
ethical considerations can be relied upon to secure the honoring of agreements. In
speaking of the "strains of commitment", for example, Rawls [1972, p178) remarks
that "self-respect"8 may be counted upon to take up the strain. But do questions of
personal integrity take precedence over questions of social justice? Is it not precisely
to elucidate such questions that the device of the original position is posited? What
value does it have as a rhetorical device if there is no a priori agreement over what
ethical ground-rules apply in the original position? Surely all ethical considerations
should he "factored out" and built into the structure over which those in the original
posi tion negotiate.
This is to take a very severe line on what is to be regarded as "natural law".
No ethical conventions are to be carried into the original position because these are
all seen as artificial and hence needing to be constructed in the original position. In
particular, to quote Hume [1739, 1)516] again:
... a promise wou'd not be intelligible, before human conven-
tions had establish'd it... even if it were intelligible, it wou'd
not be at tended with any obligation.
To follow Hume in seeking to identify moral behavior with enlightened self-
interest is certainly to cut more than one Gordian knot. But it is a strategy which
is not without its own problems. However, these are left for later papers in this
program.
8. Commitment in Harsanyi's model. The severe line on "natural law"
advocated above is not pursued in the remainder of the current paper. Instead,
Harsanyi is granted his commritment assumptions. The discussion is therefore about
the ethical preferences of those who wish that society were organized in the manner
tha t would be agreed to in the origina.l position by individuals behind the veil
of ignoianice with ani unliniited capacity for making comitmlents. This sectioni
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examines, with more care than hitherto in the paper, what such a position on
commitment buys Harsanyi in respect of the subsidiary assumptions of his model.
(i) Feasibility. There has been no discussion of the circumstances under
which a social contract to operate a state s is viable. The implicit assumption has
been that, if a state is physically achievable. then it is available as the end product
of an agreement. With no restrictions on commitment, such an assumption makes
good sense. Without commitment, the question arises of whether agents will or
will not honor the terms of the social contract. If this difficulty is taken seriously,
attention has to be restricted to social contracts which only specify behavior which
is in equilibrium. Then no party to the contract will ever have an incentive to be
the first to dishonor its terms. But, once one has started to think of So as the set
of equilibrium outcomes of the "game of life", problems begin to accumulate. In
Harsanyi's model, however, these can be neglected.
(ii) The shape of X. It has been implicitly assumed that X is convex
and comprehensive (as well as closed and bounded above, although the latter are
assumptions that will be treated as harmless). To say that X is comprehensive means
that "free disposal" is assumed-i.e. if x E X and 0 < ( < x, then e E X.
These assumptions are standard in axiomatic bargaining theory. The defense is
that, if the personal utility pairs in Y are available, then so must be those in its
"convex-comprehensive hull" X, as shaded in fig. 3B. It is argued that, if x E Y
and 0 < x, then the agents can make commitments to first achieve x and
then to "burn" sufficient utility to bring about ;. This is the argument for X to be
comprehensive. The argument for X to be convex is as follows. If x E Y, y E Y,
and z = px + (1 - p)y (0 p 1) lies on the line segment joining x and y, then
commitments can be made to the lottery which yields the "prize" x with probability p
and the "prize" y with probability 1 - p. When the agents can sign legally enforceable
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contracts, as it is often reasonable to assume in an economic context, the arguments
seem solid. But no a priori legal system exists in the original position.
These issues matter. For example, fig. 3B shows the point r selected by the
maximin criterion9 when applied to Y and the point q when it is applied to X. Can
we rely on a (hypothetical) commitment reached in the original position to remove
society from r to q? In Rawls' phrase, this would certainly impose a substantial
"strain of commitment".
The question of lotteries needs a little more attention, since the discussion of
section 7 (and of part V) hinges on whether "coin-tossing" can be seen as a legitimate
coordinating device in the original position. With commitment, there is clearly no
problem. No problem exists either, without commitment, provided that the agents
have no opportunity for communication after the fall of the coin and that the states
from which a random selection is made represent equilibria. It will then be optimal
for each agent to abide by the agreement to use the lottery. provided the other does
as well.
But usually agents will have the opportunity to communicate after the fall of
the coin. Imagine, for example. a. dispute in a new nation about which side of the
road on which to drive. Leftists argue that driving on the left leaves the right hand
on the wheel when changing gear. Rightists have some other argument. A conference
decides to settle the issue by tossing a coin. But why should the losers honor the
agreement? They can produce another coin and call for a further trial. If they do not
do so, it is because the act of honoring the agreement is itself in equilibrium. This
implies that there must be some system of checks and balances in the background
providing the necessary incentives for honest behavior. One may look to someC a
priori code of "nxat ural law" to fulfil this function. but this is not a strategemn which
I favor for the reasons given in section 7.
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Without :o7rmnitmtr cut, I therefore believe it to be important to stress that there
is not a trivial argument for the convexity of X as often proposed. But perhaps X
is convex anyway. Perhaps the back-up system of checks and balances necessary to
sustain randomizing agreements is in place. If not, there are other ways in which
options can be mixed, as in taking turns or sharing physical goods (although such
mixing does not necessarily have the same pleasant consequences for Von Neuman
and Morgenstern utilities). In any case, when X is assumed to be convex and
comprehensive when commitment is not possible, the assumption is substantive and
requires defense. Often, no such defense will be available.
(iii) Bargaining. Nash [1950] proposed a bargaining model, his "demand
game", in which each player i simultaneously makes a once-and-for-all. take-it-or-
leave-it utility demand x. If the demands are compatible (i.e. (xi, x2) E X), then
each player receives his demand. Otherwise a disagreement outcome d is implemented.
This model captures the essence of bargaining with an unlimited power to make
commitments. Such a situation reduces to a race to confront the opponent with a
take-it-or-leave-it problem. Hence one should expect all the action to be telescoped
into the first instant after which the players will have left themselves no room for
maneuver.
Nash showed that, provided there is some vestigial uncertainty about the precise
location of the frontier of X, then any non-trivial Nash equilibrium of the demand
game requires that the pair n of equilibrium demands is approximately the Nash
bargaining solution. To say n constitutes a Nash equilibrium means that n1 is an
optimal choice for player 1 given that player 2 has chosen r2, and that n 2 is an
olptimal choice for player 2 given that player 1 has chosen ni.
With full commitment, a sound defense is therefore available for using the
Nash bargaining solution to resolve the bargaining problem in the original position
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described at the end of section 4. (Further discussion appears in Part II of this
sequence of papers).
(iv) The state of nature. How is the disagreement point d determined? With
commitment, Nash [1953] has the answer to this also. If the disagreement point is
not fixed in advance, each player will accompany his or her take-it-or-leave-it demand
with a binding threat as to the action to be taken should the demand be left. The
disagreement point is then the outcome which would result if the optimal threats in
this "threat game" were to be used. (As is often the case, what actually happens
in equilibrium depends on what would happen were there to be a deviation from
equilibrium.)
Hobbes is nowadays credited with modeling the human condition as a species
of Prisoners' Dilemma game (e.g. Kavka [1986]). If this were indeed the underlying
situation (which seems to me an absurdly simplistic hypothesis), then what would be
the optimal threats for those bargaining in the original position? One may deduce
from Nash's theory that each bargainer should threaten to use his or her dominating
strategy whoever turn out to be who. But the technical details are irrelevant since,
if this were not the case, it would simply mean that there was something wrong with
Nash's theory. The conclusion is that the consequent disagreement point would be
Hobbes' state-of-nature. the "war of all against all", in which life is "solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish, and short". Of course, without commitment, one is compelled to take
a. more sophisticated view of the situation.
With commitment, Harsanyi's model therefore hangs together very well
provided that one takes a relaxed view about the difficulties concerning inter-persomal
comparison and the Harsanyi doctrine raised in sections 5 and 6. In what follows, an
attempt is made to provide some underpinning for his assumptions on these latter
top~ics.
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9. Evolution and extended sympathy. Why, unlike ants, do we have personal
preferences? This is presumably because agents whose behavior is not rigidly pre-
determined and who seek to optimize, given the beliefs experience has equipped them
with, are better able to adapt to changing environments. Why do we have extended
sympathy preferences? Because we are social a imals and need to coordinate our
behavior. For this purpose, we need to be able to put ourselves into the shoes of
others (and into the shoes of future persons t hat we might ourselves become).
What determines the preferences we have? I claim that it is ultimately questions
of evolutionary fitness1 0 (social and econorric. as well as biological). Extended
sympathy between unrelated" individuals exists to facilitate coordination and for no
other reason. If the result of the coordination affects the fitness of the individuals
involved, then the possession of certain extended sympathy preferences will favor
those that hold them at the expense of others -. ho find themselves with different
extended sympathy preferences in the same situation. The favored individuals
will then be selected by evolution. Thus the extended sympathy preferences of an
individual will be determined strategically in the long-run, given the coordinating
device being operated. Individuals may well truthfully report that they are not
misrepresenting what lies deep within their hearts. But, if an individual did not have
strategically optimal extended sympathy views, then he or she would not be around
to do any reporting.
To capture this notion, the next section studies the consequences of supposing
that extended sympathy preferences are "in equilibrium". The idea will be explained
in the context of the Harsanyi model. It will therefore be necessary to imagine a world
as-it-might-have-been in which "natural law"' for the species homo is as a. follower
of Harsanyi would wish it to be. Coordination problems are therefore resolvedI by
employing the device of the original position ir. the form described in section 4.
However, Adam and Eve will not be left to distil extended sympathy preferences from
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the air behind the veil of ignorance. .Instead, they take their real-world extended
sympathies with them as proposed in section 5.
It will not be assumed that their real-world extended sympathy preferences
are arbitrary. Evolution will be assumed to have tailored these to the pair (X, d)
of fig. 1A. The precise requirement will be that, behind the veil of ignorance, neither
player 1 nor 2 'would wuish his or her extended sympathy preferences to be other than.
they actitally are.
The mathematical implications are outlined in section 10. In brief, the
equilibrium requirement on extended sympathy preferences has a symmetric resolution
and this provides a justification of sorts for the Harsanyi doctrine'2 . Perhaps more
significantly, it also determines the ratio of the hanging constants U and V of section 6
and thereby ties down the precise rate at which Adam's utils are to be compared
with Eve's.
More on evolutionary issues will be found in parts III and IV of this program.
10. Sympathy equilibrium. Under simplifying assumptions, it will be shown that
a necessary condition for an "interior" equilibrium in extended sympathy preferences
is that the point in X implemented using Harsanyi's version of the original position
is simply the Nash bargaining solution of X relative to the disagreement point d. The
conclusions about symmetry and inter-personal comparison of utilities mentioned in
section 9 follow immediately for the reasons given at the end of this section.
It is important to stress that this result does not mean that the device of the
original position is redundant nor that the Nash bargaining solution has virtues as a
scheme..for fair arbitration. Adam and Eve have fixed extended sympathy preferences
ini tis story". The ratio U/V bunlt into these [preferenlces is tailoredl only to our pair
(X, d), which should be thought of as a surrogate for those pairs which figured large
in the evolutionary history of the population from which Adam and Eve are drawn.
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If faced with a new pair (X'.d'), they will use the same ratio U/V as for (X, d) and
hence the outcome will not be the Nash bargair.Ing solution for (X', d').
The argument begins at the point where the discussion of section 4 ends. An
asymmetric version of Harsanyi's model had been constructed and the outcome of
the bargaining in the original position, as seen by players I and 2, identified with
the Nash bargaining solution n for the pair (T. w) in fig. 2B. In what follows, it is
convenient to work in terms of underlying states, rather than directly in terms of
utilities. Recall that a deal reached in the original position can be identified with a
pair (s, t) of states, where s is to be implemented if player 1 turns out to be Adam
and player 2 to be Eve, and t is to be implemented if the roles are reversed. In terms
of s and i, the appropriate Nash product for players 1 and 2 is proportional to
(10.1) II= {f(s) +g(t)}{#f(t .+ g(s)},
where f(s) = pA(s) - p4 (so), g(s) = E(s) - 'E(so), 9 = U1 V 1 and = U2/V2 . To
see this, recall that the payoffs to players 1 and 2 when the deal (s, t) is agreed are
{4 1 (A, s) + <D1(E,t)}/2 = {UlpA(s) + 1 -V 1 (1 - WE 2,
{1 2 (A, t) + 4 2(E,s)}/2 = {U2pA(t) + 1 - V2(1 - E(s)}/2.
The disagreement payoffs are found by writing s = t = so in these expressions.
The immediate aim is to characterize the deal (s, t) at which the Nash product
is maximized for fixed values of 9 and 4. To simplify matters1 4 , attention is confined
to the case when the basic problem is "divide the dollar". The state-of-nature so then
corresponds to neither player receiving a monetary payment. The Pareto-efficient
states s are those in which Adam gets a payoff of s and Eve gets a payoff of 1- s. The
states s and t to be considered in (10.1) are therefore real numbers in the interval [0,1].
In addition, the functions f and g will be assumed to be twice differentiable on (0,1).
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Only necessary conditions for an "interior" maximum will be considered. For
this purpose, the partial derivatives of (10.1) with respect to s and t need to be
equated to zero. Thus,
(10.2) II, = 9f'(s){,f(t) + g(s)} + g'(s){9f(s) + g(t)} = 0,
(10.3) 11 = g'(t){t/f(t) + g(s)} + bf'(t){Gf(s) + g(t)} = 0.
For (10.2) and (10.3) to have a non-trivial solution in the bracketted variables, the
requirement is that
(10.4) 9 f'(s)f'(t) = g'(s)g'(t).
This last equation has a geometric interpretation. Note first that none
of the preceding analysis changes if 4i is replaced throughout by ti, where
V ii(I, s) = 4(I, s) - 4I(I, so) (i = 1, 2). This substitution allows fig. 2B
to be replaced by fig. 4A which is simpler in that both players 1 and 2 attach a utility
of 0 to the state-of-nature whether they turn out to be Adam or Eve. The analogs
of XAE and XEA have been relabeled YAE and YEA in fig. 4A, but the analogs of n,
T, u, v and w are labeled as in fig. 2B. Note that w = 0 in fig. 4A. Equation 10.4
says that the slope of the supporting line to YAE at u is equal to the slope of the
supporting line to YEA at V. (This feature of the situation is neglected in fig. 2B.)
Figures 4A and 4B here
Suppose now that an equilibrium in extended sympathy preferences occurs
when 0 = O and 0 = T. In examining the consequences of this assumption, s and
I will be taken to be differentiable funcetions of 9 and V# satisfying (10.2), (10.3) and
(10.4). Thus (s, t) is the deal negotiated in the original position when the e'xten~ld
symp~athy preferences are determined by 9 and V'. Observe that, if player l's extended
sympathy preferences are actually determined by 0 and those of player 2 by 4, but
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O is misreported as 0 while 4' is reported accurately, then player l's expected payoff
is proportional to Of(s(6, '1)) + g(t(9, 4')). A necessary condition for an "internal"
extended sympathy equilibrium is therefore that
(10.7) Of'(s)se + g'(t )te = 0.
In this and later expressions, the functions s and t, together with their partial
derivatives, are evaluated where 0 = 0 and = 4'. A corresponding necessary
condition for player 2 is that
(10.6) 'f'(t)t1 + g'(s)se = 0.
To make something of (10.5) and (10.6), it is necessary to have data on the
partial derivatives of s and t. This is obtained by differentiating (10.2) and (10.3)
partially with respect to 9 and 4. After various algebraic manipulations, the details
of which appear in an appendix, (10.5) and (10.6) yield the simple necessary condition
that
(10.7) G4'f(s)f(t) = g(s)g(t).
Like the functionally similar (10.4), this has a geometric interpretation in fig. 4A. It
is that the slope of the line joining 0 and u is the same as that joining 0 and v. This
can only happen if u = v as illustrated in fig. 4B.
An immediate consequence is that both the state s and the state t implement
the Nash bargaining solution for the pair (X. d) (as well as for (T, w)). This is the
result announced at the beginning of this section.
It follows, again immediately, that s = t. Thus, Of(s) = g(s), because u1 = v1.
Similarly, 4'f(s) = g(s). Hence 0 = 'I. This provides the justification of the
symmetry1 5 derived by Harsanyi from his doctrine. The actual value of 0, which
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determines how Adam's utils are rated against Eve's, may be found by solving the
equations
SE(S) - PE(SO ) v'E(S)
(A(s) - PE(SO) '(s)
obtained by writing s = t and 0 = 'F in (10.4) and (10.7).
11. Conclusions. Rawls' device of the original position would lead him to Harsanyi's
utilitarian outcome in those places where he currently advocates the maximin principle
if his decision theory were orthodox. Three difficulties with Harsanyi's theory are
isolated. Under certain circumstances, the requirement that extended sympathy
preferences be "in equilibrium" removes two of the difficulties. These concern the
reasons that symmetry may be assumed in the original position and the origin of the
necessary inter-personal comparison of utilities. The remaining difficulty, that of the
basis for making commitment assumptions, is seen as insuperable and requiring a
reconstruction of the model to be attempted in later papers.
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Footnotes
1. "Egalitarian" is not intended in a technical sense. Thus, Rawls' [1972]
difference principle is deemed to be egalitarian.
2. To quote Harsanyi [1958]: "Similarly. it is not a matter of social expediency,
but it is a self-evident analytical truth, that people are required to fulfil morally
binding promises".
3. The term "status quo" is used very loosely in this literature. As in this
quotation it does not necessarily refer to the state-of-nature point as would seem
natural to a bargaining theorist. Indeed, it is often used to refer to the social contract
which results from bargaining on the grounds that this is what has to be justified.
4. Assumed closed, bounded above, convex and comprehensive. Some discussion
appears in section 8.
5. In this the treatment differs from that of Harsanyi. The change in treatment
is not significant in the current context, but is necessary later in situations for which
it is not clear what Harsanyi's "ideal observer" would do. I am not, in any case, at all
happy with the notion of an "ideal observer" as employed by Harsanyi and, although
he denies the charge, also by Rawls.
6. Harsanyi restricts the choice set to be the intersection of T with the line
r1 = x2 . In the immediate context, this leaves the conclusion unaffected (see
footnote 5).
7. Rawls would not be happy with this bowdlerization of his position!
8. He says that "self-respect" is, not so much part of any rational plan of life, as
the sense that one's plan is worth carrying out". But this seems to beg the relevant
questions. The later assertion that "self-respect is reciprocally self-supporting" is an
equilibrium statement. But what sustains this equilibrium?
9. This is a convenient point to clarify the assertion of the introduction that
Rawls' "egalitarian" conclusions were to be defended. This does not mean that
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establishing the maximin criterion, as such, is the goal of later papers. Rawls [1958]
earlier advocacy of any Pareto-efficient, Pareto-improvement of all equal-split points
seems a more reasonable target. However, since, for the sake of simplicity, only
strictly convex comprehensive X are considered, the issue becomes moot. Only the
Pareto-efficient, equal-split point is then a candidate.
10. Do I really prefer Mozart to Wagner for such reasons?
11. From the biological perspective, identical twins should be seen as two agents
representing the same player.
12. Although, admittedly, it is still essentially a case of "symmetry in: symmetry
out".
13. One niight say that Adam and Eve are "committed" to these extended
sympathy preferences.
14. The result generalizes very easily.
15. This is not full symmetry in that it has only been shown that U1/V = U2/V2,
but not necessarily that U1 = U2 and V1 = V2. The latter conclusion can be
achieved by making the inessential change of replacing 42 by c4 2 , where c is a
suitable positive constant. It will no longer be true that 42(E,H) = 1, but this
does not affect the argument attributed to Harsanyi in section 4.
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The purpose of this appendix ts to verify equation (10.7) which asserts that
O-4'f(s)f(t) = g(s)g(t).
The first step is to differentiate (10.2) and (10.3) partially with respect to 9 and
#. With the help of (10.2) to (10.6), it is possible to reduce the resulting expressions
to the form
(al) 01b, = -g'(s)g(t) + eAs8 = 0,
(a2) II0, = ef'(s)f(t) + Ast = 0,
((3) H q, = Pf '(t)f (s) + Bi8 = 0,
(a4) I'f01 = -g'(t)g(s) + TBt = 0,
where,
A = e'Jf"(s)f(t) + Of"(s)g(s) + Og"(s)f(s) + 9"(s)g(t),
B = OI'f"(t)f(s) + '1f"(t)g(t) + Ig"(t)f(t) + g"(t)g(s).
To illustrate how this is done, consider (al). From (10.2),
8He = O{(fg)'(s) + fIf'(s)f(t)} + Osg{O'If"(s)f(t)Of f"(s)g(s) + 2ef'(s)g'(s)+
... + Og"(s)f(s) + g"(s)g(t)} + Gt{eJf'(s)f'(t) + g'(s)g'(t)}.
The terms in the first bracket are equal to -g'(s)g(t) by (10.2). The terms in the final
bracket cancel with 26f'(s)g'(s) in the middle bracket as a consequence of (10.4) and
(10.5).
The elimination of A and B from (al) - (a4) yields that
(a5) g'(s)g(t)sg, =-2
(a6) g'(t)g(s)to = -- I2 f'(t)f(s)t 7 .
34
It remains to note that these equations, together with (10.5) and (10.6),
constitute a system of four homogeneous linear equations in the four unknowns
Qf'(s)se, g'(t)te, g'(s)s, and 'If'(t)tp. The condition for a non-trivial solution is
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